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LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF COMMERCIAL BANKING IN WISCONSIN
WILLIAM L.

CROW*

A

man who is now a justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
struck the key-note of a legislative objective in the control of
banking, when, as state senator, he addressed the members of "theWisconsin Bankers' Association:
"A bank is a quasi-public institution. It exists solely by the permission of the law. The banking business, if carried on at all, must
be carried on subject to the burdens and restrictions imposed by law.
It has been the effort of every country in the civilized world to promote
a strong system of banking. The state seeks to regulate the business
because it is a business which so vitally affects the welfare of its citizens and of the body politic itself. A strong bank is a blessing to a
community. A strong banking system is a security to a state or nation. A weak bank is a detriment to a community and likewise a weak
banking system is a menace to a state or nation. One bank failure carries in its wake untold hardship and suffering, even where it does not
precipitate runs on, and pull down, other banks, thus adding to the
direful results. It is therefore important that every state and every
nation have the strongest and best banking system that can be devised
by the intelligence of the law making bodies acting from motives of
the highest patriotism. If this accomplishment should require the imposition of additional burdens upon those who engage in the business
it should be regarded as but an incident to a most beneficent plan. No
imposition or burden, not destructive of the business itself, should be
given the least consideration in opposition to any plan or system that
* Professor of Government, Lawrence College; J.S.D., Uiniversity of Chicago.
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makes for the security of the depositor.' It is the public by whose per-

mission banks exist that should be accorded first consideration at the
hands of the law making power, and the public interests should never
be sacrificed to swell bank dividends or to give one bank an advantage
over another. Any other policy smacks of special privilege and selfish
interest, and under our form of government it2 is the whole people
whose interest should be jealously safeguarded."
HISTORICAL OUTLINE.

It is necessary for a complete understanding of the legislative control of commercial banking in Wisconsin to outline some of the significant related events in the history of the state.
The first constitutional convention which met in 1846 introduced
a provision into the proposed constitution prohibiting both banks of
issue and banks of deposit. Dire experience with failing banks and
worthless currency furnished the reason. Although sentiment was
overwhelming for the prohibition in the convention, the constitution
met defeat by the people largely because of the efforts of the Whigs
and others who believed that such a wide departure from the principles of constitution-making was unwarranted.
Naturally enough the second constitution again showed the effect
of extraordinary caution. It contained a provision that banking laws
must be submitted to the people before becoming effective. 3 This constitution was ratified in 1848.
Within a period of three years there developed a strong demand for
banks, with the result that the legislature passed an act which was presented to the people and ratified. This, the act of 1852,1 was practically entirely concerned with the regulation of banks of issue, although banks of deposit were authorized.5 Thus 1852 becomes an outstanding date in the history of Wisconsin bank legislation.6
With the exception of a law providing for a bank examiner in
1895,- from 1852 until the beginning of the present century there was
1 Italics ours.
2 Walter C. Owen, Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Convention of the

Wisconsin Bankers' Association, 1909, p. 159.
This provision was by no means unique in Wisconsin, but was employed by
several other states of the North and West.
4 Chapter 479.
Section 18.
6 See Clarence B. Hadden, "History of Early Banking in Wisconsin," Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters, Vol. X,
1894-1895, pp. 174 ff.
7 Chapter 291. The state treasurer, by and with the approval of the governor,
was authorized to appoint a bank examiner. Section 11 of the law is interesting. A bank was given thirty days to make good a capital deficiency discovered by the examiner, after which he was to publish in certain newspapers a notice of the refusal or neglect of the bank to make the deficiency
good. This law is an illustration of early legislative regulation which by indirection would attain the objectives of both restraint and liberty. See
Ernst Freund, "Legislative Regulation," New York, 1932, p. 63.
3
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only negligible additional legislation, although the federal law taxing
state bank notes out of existence s gave rise to the growth of banks of
deposit, thereby inviting the necessity for rather extensive measures
of new control. Governor Taylor in 1874, in his message to the Legislature, said: "The depositor in a state bank has no adequate security
against loss, his faith in the integrity and capacity of its officers being
really his only guarantee." He called attention to the necessity for
legislation to increase the liability of stockholders, and recommended
that banks be placed under the authority of the state, with a system
of inspection, in order that the public might no longer be in the dark
concerning the capital and the investments of its banks.9
The absence of any substantial bank legislation can be attributed
largely to the difficulties attending the submission of acts for popular
approval. 10 While in some other states the necessity was obviated by
judicial decision on the ground that the constitutional prohibition applied only to banks of issue," this situation did not prevail in Wiscon2
sin, owing to a different interpretation of the court.'
In 18971" a comprehensive bank law was passed by the legislature,
but was defeated when presented to the people in November of the
following year. While a majority of the people did not vote at all, it
appears that the chief arguments instrumental in defeating the act were
that there was too much power over appointments given to the bank
commissioner, too great a limitation on real estate loans to the alleged
detriment of the farmer, and an injustice in placing the expense of

8 Chapter 78, section 6, U.S. Statutes at Large (1865). The law took effect on

July 1, 1866.
9 Message of William R. Taylor, Assembly Journal, 1874, p. 16, appendix.
lo L. B. Krueger, "Evolution of Unit Banking as Exemplified by Conditions in
Wisconsin," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Wisconsin, p. 195 (1920).
"'Those states having provisions for referendum, in addition to Wisconsin,
were Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, and Ohio. See Pape v.
Capitol Bank, 20 Kan. 440 (1878) ; People v. Loew'enthal, 93 Ill.
191 (1879).
Allen v. Clayton, 63 Ia. 11, 18 N.W. 663, 50 Am. Rep. 716 (1884) ; Dearborn
v. N. W. Savings Bank, 42 Oh. St. 617, 51 Am. Rep. 851 (1885). See also,

Ernst Freund, "Standards of American Legislation," Chicago (1917), pages
160 and 162.

12State ex rel. Reedsburg Bank v. Hastings, 12 Wis. 47 (1860).

While the
Wisconsin court came to a conclusion resulting in a detriment to the effective legislative control of commercial banking, there seems to be a real
reason for the decision. The fact that both banks of issue and banks of deposit were prohibited in the first proposed constitution throws light on the
real intent of the framers. Furthermore, the constitutional provision referring to "any bank, banking power or privilege hzatever" made any other
decision difficult, although the reasoning in the Illinois and Ohio decisions
points in the other direction. The Iowa and Kansas courts apparently had
sounder footing, not only in the contexts of the constitutions involved, but
in the debates of the constitutional conventions as well.
"3Chapter 303.
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bank examinations upon the state1 4 rather than upon the banks, as had
been provided in the law of 1895."
In 1902 the constitution of the state was amended, 16 abolishing the
requirement that banking laws should be referred to the people for approval. T3ut as indicative of the prejudice that had not been entirely
removed, there was a provision that all laws should receive a twothirds vote of both houses.
Under this new provision of the constitution a rather elaborate
banking law was passed by the legislature, repealing all acts of which
it was amendatory. Thus the banking law of 190317 is the basis of the
present control of banks and banking in Wisconsin. It will be the purpose of this article to indicate the evolutionary trends in this period of
approximately thirty years.
PRIVATE BANKING.

Before 1903 anyone in Wisconsin could establish a bank by common right without restriction. As a result, many private banks were
operated by individuals in connection with another business ;'s or if a
company was formed, its preliminary assets might consist, not of cash,
but of only the subscribers' promissory notes. 9
This type of individual operation was attended with numerous defects and dangers, the net result being anything but satisfactory.20 If
a banker were engaged in another business, as he generally was, the
creditors of that business would share with the depositors in case of a
failure; and upon the death of the banker, the temporary suspension
of business for the purpose of probate might result in demoralizing
the confidence of customers. 2 ' Furthermore, an inspection by the state
would be fruitless if it did not take into consideration the personal assets and liabilities of the banker as well as those which were more ex2
clusively concerned with his various other business ventures. 1
The policy of the state has always been to make examination fees support
the banking department. A schedule of fees was provided in each of the
following years: 1895 (chapter 291), 1903 (chapter 234), 1911 (chapter 172),
1921 (chapter 473), and 1932 (chapter 10, Special Session, 1931).
"5This conclusion is based upon editorial comments appearing in The Milwaukee Sentinel for November 5 and November 22, 1895.
16 Article XI, section 4.
2 Chapter 234.
Is See letters from several Wisconsin bankers, quoted in the Chicago Banker,
February 16, 1905.
39 L. B. Krueger, "Evolution of Unit Banking etc.", op. cit., pp. 203-204.
20 "While it was always conceded .... that many of the private banks of Wisconsin, while they were in existence, were strong and irreproachable institutions, it must be said that they were the exceptions." Ninth Annual Report
of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 15 (1903).
21 W eed v. Bergh, 141 Wis. 569, 124 N.W. 664 (1910).
2Fifth Annual Report of the'Bank of Examiner, p. xii (1899).
'1
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An attempted remedy for these defects was a bill 3 which would
exempt the assets of the bank from the claims of 'outside creditors.
Laying aside the point of its dubious constitutionality on the ground
of its being a deprivation of the equal protection of the laws, such an
enactment would have been a potent instrument in facilitating fraud
on the part of the banker by enabling him to transfer part of his assets
to the bank upon any indication of an approaching failure.
Upon the recommendation of the bank examiner that steps be taken
in the direction of control,24 and after the pronouncement of Governor
La Follette that "the savings of no community should be hazarded,
under the seeming protection of the law and without security of any
kind in the private ventures of an individual who adopts the title of
Banker to inspire public confidence," 2 a law26 was passed which had
27
even the immediate effect of abolishing all private banks.

This law prohibited, by the imposition of a substantial penalty, the
use of the word "bank" as an office sign or upon written or printed
materials by other than banking corporations properly organized in
accordance with the laws of the state and authorized by charter from
the commissioner for the purpose of engaging in the business of bank2

ing.

8

THE COMISSIONER OF BANKING

An ideal for the purpose of making the office of supervisor of
banks29 a significant factor in control was established by the State
Bank Division of the American Bankers' Association by setting up
these as the fundamental requirements :30
1. That the state supervisor devote all of his time to the supervision of banking;
2. That the tenure of office be made secure and lasting;
3. That the compensation and discretionary power be sufficient to
attract executives of outstanding ability;
23

258A, (1901).
Eighth Annual Report of the Bank Examiner, p. xii (1902).
25 Message of Robert iMl. La Follette to the Legislature of 1903, Assembly
Journal, p. 99.
26 Chapter 234, chapter II, section 45, Laws of 1903.
27 Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 15 (1903).
28 See Ernst Freund, "The Police Power," p. 420. Ostensibly this legislation appeared as regulation, but the actual effect, which was intended, was prohibition. The control, however, was only indirect; if the business could thrive
without a label, there was legally no objection to its continuance.
29The supervisor in Wisconsin is called a commissioner of banking. In other
states he is given various designations, as State Examiner, Superintendent of
Banks, Auditor of Public Accounts, etc. The office was created in WAlisconsin in 1903.
30 See Report of the State Legislative Committee (1927), 20 Jour. of American
Bankers Association 321.
24
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4. That the supervisor be as free from the entanglements of politics as the judiciary.
It is of interest to inquire to what extent Wisconsin has approached
this stated ideal.
The duties of the commissioner extend to the supervision of commercial banking, and the business conducted by trust companies, building and loan associations, small loan companies, credit unions, and
other designated financial institutions. The commissioner has no control over insurance.
He now enjoys very substantial powers, some advisory and some
discretionary. He may make recommendations to the banking review
board 3' as to the advisability of, and the terms of, bank consolidation ;32 or recommend to the board that he should take possession of a
bank when it shall appear that any law has been violated, capital impaired, examination refused, or that the management by officers or
employees3 3 puts safety in jeopardy, with power to proceed immediately if in his opinion such action is imperative. 34 When, in his judgment,
it is necessary or expedient, he may make all necessary examinations
and audits or devote any necessary attention to the conduct of the affairs of any state bank ;35 if he finds that the capital of the bank is
impaired, he has the power to require that the deficiency be made
good ;36 he may permit the operation of receiving and disbursing stations in small communities in order that they may not be deprived of
banking facilities ;37 and he may obtain information from banks at any
time as to the names of stockholders, their residences, and the amount
of their stock holdings. 38 That he shall not be trammeled in the exercise of his duties, he may appoint as many examiners and clerks to
assist him as he may find necessary ;39 and to stimulate courageous
moves on his part he shall suffer no civil liability or criminal penalty
31 Created by Chapter 10, section 2, Laws of Special Session (1931).
32 Chapter 10, section 9, Laws of Special Session (1931).
33 As a further protection to depositors, every person in the employ of a bank
having control over funds must give an adequate fidelity bond. Chapter 10,
section 14, Laws of Special Session (1931).
34 Chapter 10, section 8, Laws of Special Session (1931).
3' Chapter 10, section 4, Laws of Special Session (1931).
36 Chapter 10, section 7, Laws of Special Session (1931).
This is subject to review at the request of the bank involved upon a stated
objection.
3' Chapter 10, section 9, Laws of Special Session (1931).
38 Chapter 10, section 10, Laws of Special Session (1931).
39 Chapter 15, section 2, Laws of Special Session (1931).
One of the serious objections to the act of 1897 (chapter 303) was the fact
that the commissioner of banking was given power to appoint as many assistants as he pleased. See editorial, "A Good Law," The Milwaukee Sentinel, November 5, 1898.
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for any error of judgment for any action made in good faith and upon
reasonable grounds."
The maximum salary of $7,500 which he may receive 4 ' is somewhat commensurate with the high position of his office under the new
imposition of duties and the enlargement of powers.
While the commissioner is appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate, 42 and is therefore not divorced from
the possibilities of entangled politics, the designation of a five year
term41 has the effect of reducing political control to a very consider44

able extent.

When measured by the standards set up by the American Bankers'
Association, it is apparent that Wisconsin is entitled to a high rank in
dealing with the office of commissioner of banking.
THE BANKING REVIEWy BOARD.

There is unquestionably much merit, at least during times of great
stress in the commercial world when frequent and important decisions
must be made, in a board which is in a position to act in an advisory
capacity, to strengthen the position of the commissioner in his decisions, to act in a checking capacity in several respects, to make important decisions in its own right, and in general to support a much
more vigorous policy of bank control than would be possible with single responsibility. Whefher upon the return of an era of business
ascendancy the necessity for a board with such powers will be removed
is still the unknown in an interesting and developing social experiment.
The legislature in special session in 1931-1932, 45 in common with
a number of states that rely to a greater or less extent upon plural re-

Chapter 26, section 1, Laws of Special Session (1931).
41 Chapter 7, section 3, Laws of 1933.
42 Chapter 234, chapter I, section 2, Laws of 1903; Section 220.01, Statutes of
1931. Most of the states designate appointment by the governor by and with
the consent of the senate. The commissioner is popularly elected in Illinois
and Florida; selected by a banking board or commission in Oregon and Virginia; appointed by the governor from five nominated by the state bankers'
association in Tennessee; appointed by the governor upon advice of the
executive council of bankers in South Carolina; and by the bankers directly
in Mississippi.
43 Chapter 234, chapter I, section 2, Laws of 1903.
44 While the Wisconsin Bankers' Association had the matter of political control
up for discussion in 1918, there was no suggestion that the method of appointment be changed, but there was adherence to the ideal of non-political
control. Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Convention, pp. 118-120
(1918).
45 Chapter 10, section 2.
40
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sponsibility,4 6 created a banking review board,47 consisting of five
members with five year terms, appointed by the governor with the advice and consist of the senate, with compensation on a per diem
basis. As for their qualifications, at least two of them shall have at
least five years' banking experience.

48

The duties of the board are to advise with the commissioner, to review his decisions, and to make judgments upon his recommendation.
The board has the same power to subpoena witnesses as is possessed
by the industrial commission. Final orders of the board may be reviewed in the circuit court of Dane county, this being the location of
the seat of government, unless an appeal is otherwise specified by
law.49 While the duties of the board are to a large extent advisory,
decisions in the administration of the banking department are by no
means negligible. If certain statutory causes exist5 ° which give rise
to the necessity of taking over the business of a bank, the board must
make the decision except in case of extreme urgency. 51 The power of
decision as to the question of new banks, which was formerly vested
in the commissioner of banking, has now been placed in the hands of
5 2

the board.

46 The following states have banking boards of varying powers.

The board of
Alabama may direct the superintendent of banking to take.over banks for
certain statutory causes [section 6299, Banking Civil Code, 1928], and may
review the decisions of the superintendent in refusing a charter [section
6355]. In Connecticut, the banking commissioner is a member of a banking
commission which approves increases of capital stock [section 3887, Laws,
1931], and to approve and disapprove charters [section 3877]. The banking
board of Iowa acts in an advisory capacity only [chapter 412-Al, section
9154-a8, Banking Law, 1931], as does the board in Kansas [section 90, Banking Law, 1931]. In Nevada the state board of finance sits as a banking
board, and, in connection with the state bank examiner-, has supervision and
control of banking [section 698, Hillyer's Nevada Compiled Laws, 1929].
The duty of the commission in North Carolina is "policy-determining, sitting as a court of final jurisdiction on appeals from rulings of the bank
commissioner." [Editor's note on chapter 5, article 7, section 221 (o),
Banking Laws, 1931]. In North Dakota the department of banking is in the
hands of a state banking board [chapter 96, section 1, S. L. 1931]. A banking board in Texas consisting of the banking commissioner and two other
state officers, has the supervision of banks [article 439, Statutes, 1928]. The
Virginia code [chapter 146, 1930] provides for a state corporation commission which is given certain powers over the administration of banks [section
4149 (52)].
4 A board of review, consisting of the governor, the secretary of state, and
the attorney general, the duty of which was to pass merely upon decisions
of the commissioner with respect to bank charters, was abolished upon the
creation of the new board. Chapter 10, section 11, Laws of Special Session
(1931).
4S There is probably much wisdom displayed in selecting the personnel from
active bankers, as a powerful outside control might be much more easily
charged with, and subject to, bureaucratic tendencies.
49Chapter 10, section 2, Laws of Special Session (1931).
50 See Note 34.
51 Chapter 10, section 8, Laws of Special Session (1931).
.2 Chapter 10, section 12, Ibid.
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BANK CO-MPETITION.

While public sentiment has favored unlimited competition among
banks, treating them like other business organizations in which men of
good character and average business ability might engage with freedom,5 3 banking authorities have been for some time of the opinion,
and are now in practical agreement that an excessive number of banks
is one of the primary causes of bank failures. 54 A special joint committee, appointed by the legislature of Minnesota for the purpose of
making a study of the banking situation in that state, after pointing out
that it is now almost universally admitted that banking supervisors
have granted too many charters, states that "one of the outstanding
factors which have caused the present situation in Minnesota is the
fact that there have been too many banks.

' 55

A very late report of the

Economic Policy Commission recommends that "the greatest care and
moderation should be exercised in granting new charters, so as to
guard against over-banking or the launching of new banks by unqualified persons, which have doubtless been serious factors in the bank
failure situation in. the past." 56
The commissioner of banking of Wisconsin 57 was no laggard in
perceiving this as a fundamental cause of bank failure. In his report
for 191158 he called attention to the menace of free competition, stated
that too many banks had been organized during the year that had just
passed, and urged the enactment of legislation in the interest of restriction. The statute in existence in 1911", provided, first, that the
articles of incorporation should be approved by the commissioner,
which, he correctly observed, had reference only to his power over
form and content; and, second, that he should grant a certificate authorizing a bank to commence business when the capital had been paid
53 Report of the Economic Policy Commission (1927), 20 Jour. of the Am erican
Bankers Association, 304 at 305. 0. M. W. Sprague, professor of Banking
at Harvard University, assisted in the investigation which preceded this report, which was made to the Houston convention of the American Bankers'
Association.
54Too many banks has been named as the primary cause of bank failures by
Dan V. Stephens in an article entitled "Adjusting Banking to Changing
Conditions" (1927), 20 Jour.of the American Bankers Association, 323. Writing later in Nation's Business, he referred to the fact that the principle of
the "survival of the fittest" has been applied to banks, but concludes that "a
bank can no more be subjected to competition of that character safely and
successfully than can a post office." "Nebraska's Bank Experiment," February, 1929.
55 Report of the Joint Special Committee of the House and Senate, Minnesota,
p. 2 (1927).
56
"The Situation that Confronts Banking," Report presented by R. S. Hecht,
Chairman, Economic Policy Commission, American Bankers' Association,
before the Executive Council, Augusta, Ga., April 15, 1931, p. 23.
5 Albert E. Kuolt.
58 Seventeenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. xv (1911).
59 Section 2024-8, Chapter 109, Laws of 1905.
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in, in cash, withholding it in case he had reason to believe that the corporation had been formed for other than legitimate banking business.6 0
He pointed to the inadequacy of the statute, referring to the fact
that only the one cause for disapproval was provided for, and that the
time of disapproval came when the bank was ready for business, thus
causing unnecessary loss to many innocent stockholders. He then
continued with his recommendations:
"The power of refusal should be coincident with the first overtures
to organize a new bank . . . The authority to disapprove . . . ought

to be amplified
to the end that harmful competition may be pre6'1
vented.

The result was that the legislature gave him some control by authorizing him to disapprove applications for charters by undesirable individuals 6 2 which he thought would be of service in increasing efficiency.6 3 But realizing that the legislature had fallen short of its duty,
he again emphatically recommended control over new banks by stating
that it was "plainly evident to one who had made a careful analysis of
64
the banking business" that additional banks would invite disaster.
This vigorous espousal of the cause for additional controlling legislation, coupled with a significant administrative event,6 brought at the
next session of the legislature an additional provision, giving the com-

60 Section 2024-12.
61 The proposal to control the establishment of new banks was stubbornly opposed by The Madison Democrat. "No state officer in any circumstances
should be clothed with the colossal power to forbid any man to engage in
banking so long as that man is able to comply with the proper regulations
which now are assuring to Wisconsin citizens banking so unusually safe.
.... The legislature should not be persuaded for an instant to concede any
such rights as the commissioner demands." Editorial, "Shutting Out Banks,"
February 18, 1913. Compare this with an antipodal philosophy: "......
in
the banking law of the state of New York, which is largely the product of
the best thought of our most intelligent bankers, powers are conferred upon
the Superintendent of Banks which makes him almost an autocrat. Like the
ancient seigniors, he has the power of life and death .. " George I. Skinner,
"Model State Banking Laws," Preceedings of the Forty-Fifth Annual Convention of the American Bankers' Association, 660 at 666 (1919).
62 Chapter 749, Laws of 1913.
63 Nineteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 10 (1913).
64 Twentieth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 11 (1914).
65 Early in 1914 an application for a second bank at Mosinee was refused on
the grounds that the amount of business did not warrant additional banking
facilities, that there was convincing evidence of its being a "spite bank,"
that it was being dominated by outside interests, and that the largest subscribers of stock were unsafe parties to be engaged in the business of banking. An appeal was taken to the board of review, consisting of the governor,
secretary of state, and attorney general, where the commissioner's decision
was reversed on the grounds that it would be unconstitutional to delegate
legislative power to an administrative officer, and that the statutes had not
been violated by the applicants. It was obvious that such an impasse in the
future could only be obviated by a change in the law, a recommendation the
comlissioner proceeded to make. See Twentieth Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Banking, p. 10 (1914).
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missioner power to pass upon proposed new banks from the standpoint
of public convenience and advantage, 66 a power which even before this
67

law was passed had been exercised.

In 1921 an extraordinarily comprehensive law was passed, 68 giving
the commissioner of banking more power to base his approval or disapproval of applications for charters upon these points:
1. The character, responsibility, and general fitness of the persons
named in the application with reference to their ability to command
confidence and to warrant the belief that the business of the proposed
corporation will be honestly and efficiently conducted;
1
2. The question as to the promotion of public convenience and advantage if the bank should organize;
3. The character and experience of the proposed officers, the adequacy of existing banking facilities, and the need of further banking
capital;
4. The outlook for the growth and development of the city, town,
or village in which the bank is to be located, and the surrounding territory from which patronage would be drawn;
5. The interest rate which existing banks charge to borrowers;
6. The methods and banking practices of the existing bank or
banks;
7. The character of the service which they .render the community,
and the prospects for the success of the proposed bank if efficiently
managed.6 9
66 Chapter 441, Laws of 1915. The constitutionality of a similar statute was

passed upon by the supreme court of Kansas in the case of Schaake v. Dolley
et al., 85 Kan. 598, 1"18 Pac. 80, 37 L.R:A. (N.S.) 877 (1911). The Comptroller of the Currency had taken this position in the absence of statutory
regulation:
"To say that the comptroller, bank supervisor, or any other power to issue bank charters, must give one to all who apply, irrespective of conditions, is preposterous." Reference is made to this statement in an editorial,
"Regulation of Bank Organization," The Outlook, XCIX, p. 800, December
2, 1911. It was doubtless the position of the comptroller regarding administrative authority that prompted the commissioner of banking in Wisconsin
to make his decision in the .osinee affair. In his report for 1911, page xv,
67 he states that the power is properly exercised.
Nineteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 6 (1913).
0 Chapter 555.
69 A comparison with the law of Iowa on this point of control over new banks
is enlightening:
"No such (banking) association shall have the right to commence business until its officers or its stockholders shall have furnished to the superintendent of banking a sworn statement of the paid-up capital, and, when
the said superintendent is satisfied as to that fact, he shall issue to such
association a certificate authorizing it to commence business." Chapter
414, section 9207, Banking Laws of Iowa (1931).
Iowa has been selected for this comparison not only because it is an important neighboring state, but because the Wisconsin commissioner in his report for 1927 referred to the fact that there was in that state, with its many
bank failures, one bank to every eleven hundred of population compared to
twenty-four hundred in Wisconsin, and drew the conclusion, from this and
other facts, that bank troubles are directly related to inadequate bank population.

THE MARQUETTE LA U" REVIE11'
CLEARING HOUSE ASSOCIATIONS.

Co-ordination, systematization, standardization, and examination
systems are the non-mechanical products of clearing house associations
which had their origin in a mechanical function, viz., the clearing of
checks.70
A far-reaching clearing house bill,71 having for its dual function
the improvement of banking and the lodging of greater control in the
state over the banking business, was recommended by the special interim legislative committee of 1931,72 but it failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote to become a law.
The bill would create clearing house districts, not less than twenty
nor more than thirty-five in number, to be fixed by the commissioner
of banking, but subject to the approval of the banking review board.
Within each district there may be created a clearing house association,
composed of three or more banks or trust companies, whether state or
national,7 3 the association to be governed by a board of nine directors
who must be directors or officers of member banks and trust companies and who reside within the district.
The purpose of these clearing house associations is to promote
safety, to improve service, render advice, give auditing service to member banks, furnish information as to credit risks and investments, assist in the collection of items, and to promote the raising of funds on
local credits held by banks.
The powers of these associations include the making of studies of
bank conditions looking to improvement; to make recommendations
concerning bank organizations, records, and investments, the latter including the handling of money and the making of local loans; to make
studies and recommendations to be effected by bank reorganizations
and consolidations; to promote organizations for the purpose of lending money on or discounting local loans; to issue publications dealing
with the problem of making safe investments and loans within the
district, and generally to do those things which would promote the objectives of safety, better service, and improved credit facilities.
In order to stimulate membership in these clearing house associations and to preserve the system of unit banking, it is provided that
no public funds can be deposited in any bank unless it is a member of
70See "The Banking Situation in the United States," prepared by Ralph A.
Young and assistants of the Conference Board's Research Staff, National
Industrial Conference Board, Inc., New York, p. 26 (1932).
712 5A, Special Session (1931).
7 Assembly Journal, Special Session, p. 61 (1931).
'7 Doubt as to the constitutionality of a provision which would give some control over national banks was expressed by some, with the result that a provision was introduced to the effect that the unconstitutionality of one part
would not affect any other part.
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the association; that no bank shall make any loans on the stock of any
other bank unless that other bank is a member of an association; and
that no bank shall make any loan collateralized by the shares of any
corporation which has more than twenty per cent of its assets invested in the stock of banks or trust companies, or which owns more
than fifteen per cent of the stock of more than five banks or trust companies in Wisconsin. Nor shall any bank become a member of the association if more than ten per cent of its stock is held by any corporation or association. 4
THE DUTY OF DIRECTORS.

There is much evidence to support the conclusion that directors
can play a very substantial role in supervising their banks in the interest of safety. Writing in the Chicago Banker in 1905, Joseph Chapman
stated that he had heard it said by both the state superintendent of
banking and the Comptroller of the Currency that "no national bank
:r state bank has ever failed where the directors have done their
duty."" The special joint committee of the house and senate of Minnesota, after considerable study surrounding the bank-failure situation
in their own state, came to the conclusion that in spite of the deflation
in values, conservative management would have saved the banks, and
that if there had been real supervision by the directors, frequent meetings and discussions, the number of fatalities would have been very
substantially lessened." Speaking before the Florida Bankers' Association in 1928, Joseph W. McIntosh, Comptroller of the Currency,
said

:77

"It is my belief that failures of many banks could'iave been and
can be averted if the directors would give closer attention to the affairs of the bank .

. .

. Most failures involve mismanagement in some

form ..... .They (directors) must maintain a supervision of the
bank's affairs, have a general knowledge of the character of the busi-

74 The provisions directed at the control of chain and group banking give rise
to queries as to the actual purpose of the bill. It was stated in a Madison
newspaper: "Protection of depositors should be the first aim of all banking
laws. Whether that thought is as present in the proposed bill before the
interim legislative committee as is state domination of the banking situation
is doubtful." Editorial, "State Domination Aim of Bill," The IVisconsin
State Journal,October 19, 1931.
There is exhibited in this bill an ingenious method of control of group
and chain banking, corresponding closely to the methods of publicity. Group
and chain banks are not prohibited: the bankers must choose between the
merits of their system and the desirability of membership in an association.
75 "Bank Examinations," June 15, 1905.
76
Report (1927) op. cit., pp. 3 and 5.
77 Quoted in The New York Times, April 5, 1928.
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ness and the manner in which it is conducted and to know on what security at least its large lines of credit are given." 7
The laws of Wisconsin dealing with directors have been progressively strengthened by the enumeration of restrictions and the addition
of duties. The provision for a board with a minimum of three members, which remained from 1903 7 to 1925, was changed in the latter
year to a minimum of five. 0 There were no residence requirements in
the defeated act of 1897.- In 190381 there was a provision that a majority of the directors should be residents of Wisconsin, while in
193182 the law was changed to require all the directors to be residents
of Wisconsin, and that a majority should be residents oi the county or
of the adjoining counties where the bank is located. On the question
of stock ownership, the law of 1903 was silent. The Legislature of
192583 provided that a director should own at least one share, but the
amount to be owned was raised in 193184 to a minimum of one per
cent for banks with a capital of less than $50,000, or a par value of
$500 for banks with a capital of $50,000 or more, this stock, furthermore, not to be pledged as collateral security. The defeated act of
189715 merely stated that directors should perform their duty. In
19036 it was provided that a committee should examine the affairs c
the bank, thereafter making a report to the board; but a still more efT

fective provision was made a part of the law of 1911,7 placing the

duty upon the whole board, and then specifying that duity as being an
investigation of the affairs of the bank and a determination as to
whether the value of the assets corresponds to that at which they are
carried on the books of the bank.88 The law respecting the duty of directors was fufther strengthened in 193189 by a provision for a loan
78 There is always a question for legislative determination as to just how great

a duty may be laid on a board of directors. The legislative committee of
1910 prepared a bill (Report, p. 40) providing at each monthly meeting for
personal inspection of each loan and discount item, a verification of signatures of makers and indorsers, and a determination of the value of the items
carried. The Wisconsin Bankers' Association thought these duties were too
onerous, and that no one with such a burden would act as a director. Proceedings of Wisconsin Bankers' Association, pp. 89-90 (1910).
79 Chapter 234, chapter II, section 9.
80 Chapter 292.
8I Chapter 234, chapter II, section 9.
82 Chapter 432.
83 Chapter 292.
84 Chapter 249.
85 Chapter 303, section 10.
88 Chapter 234.
87 Chapter 432.
88 The commissioner reported that the directors had readily responded to this
new provision. Sixteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking,
p. xiv (1911).
89 Chapter 250.
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committee from the directors other than active executive officers to determine policies concerning applications and renewals. Finally, significant changes were made in the number of meetings of the board. The
defeated act of 1897 was silent on the subject; the law of 190390 provided for meetings every six months; the law of 1911, 91 every three
months; the law of 1931,92 every month. 93 And for the purpose of

making this more than a mere formal statutory requirement, the legislature provided that if any director should be lax in attendance at
meetings he should be removed by the commissioner.
The office of commissioner of banking has been alert in stimulating active interest and participation on the part of directors. The commissioner in his report for 190714 devotes considerable space to the
question of supervision, relating how he has sent letters to directors
reminding them of their duties, and requesting them to leave their
regular work to co-operate with the bank examiner. "When bank directors are strictly held to their sworn duty, and then only, does bank
supervision constitute the full measure of protection to depositors
contemplated by law. It has been my endeavor ....
to make it plain
to bank directors ....
that the law imposes upon them active, not pas-

sive duties." Again, says the commissioner in 1915, 95 "if a board of
directors gives proper attention to the affairs of a bank, invariably an
examination, discloses a healthy condition." Bank examiners were instructed to bring the matter of responsibility to the attention of directors, who, at special meetings called at the time of examination, were
provided with a report covering facts relating to the bank.96 Frequent
meetings of the directors were considered so important by the commissioner of banking that he recommended monthly meetings four
years before the legislature made the change.97
LICENSES FOR BANKERS.

The legislative interim committee on banking in 1931 discussed a
proposal requiring licenses for bank officials,98 an idea by no means altogether new in the state, as the commissioner of banking in 1912, aft90 Chapter 234.
91 Chapter 432.
92 Chapter 250.
d3 It is interesting to note that the special legislative committee on banking in
1910, after stressing the great importance of supervision by directors, recommended and prepared a bill providing for monthly meetings. Report, pp.
20 and 40-41.
94
Twelfth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 9.
95
9 Twenty-first Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 17.
o Ninteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 6.
97
98 Thirty-third Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 9 (1927).
illeetings and Hearings of the Legislative Interim Committee on Banking,
II, p. 228 (1931).
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er pointing out that the state requires examinations of those pursuing
the liberal professions and many of the trades, recommended the establishment by law of certain efficiency standards for the managing o fficers of new banks. 9 The bill proposed to the interim committee"'
would constitute the commissioner of banking and the banking review
board a licensing body to issue licenses on the basis of examination or
school certificates indicating a certain knowledge of banking, such licenses to be revocable in case of violations of any laws or orders of
the commissioner, or any mismanagement or incompetency in bank
operations. 0' The proposed bill was similar to a law of Nebraska,
which was passed in that state upon the recommendation of the Ne-

braska State Bankers' Association. 0 2
iINIMUi

CAPITAL.

With a present minimum capital requirement of $30,000,103 Wisconsin makes a creditable showing when compared with other states of
the Union.10 4 Nevertheless, there is a substantial failure to reach the
recommendation of the Economic Policy Commission, which would
have no capitalization below $50,000.15 Even the present minimum
has been obtained with considerable hesitancy and difficulty. 0 ' The
laws of 1852107 provided for a minimum capital of $25,000, but an
99 Eighteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. xviii.

100Meetings and Hearings, I p. 22 (1931).
101 For a discussion in favor of the licensing system, see Roy L. Bone, "Too

Many Banks, Too Few Bankers," (1926), 19 Jour. of American Bankers Association. 340. H. H. Sherwood of the Bank of Gays Mills, Wisconsin, argues
against the licensing system on the ground that successful bank administration is very largely dependent upon judgment, which cannot be tested by an
examination. Meetings and Hearings, II p. 270 (1931).
It is the opinion of the author that while there is value in initial control,
the greater value lies in the control that can be exercised through the power
of revocation. In view of the removal power given to the commissioner in
case of any evidences of mismanagement, a great part of the necessity for a
license has been removed. Chapter 10, section 8, Laws of Special Session
(1931).
1'02 See C. M. Harger, "Nebraska Licenses Its Bankers," 19 Jour. of Avmerican
Bankers Assoczation. 49: (1927)
103 Chapter 10, section 13, Laws of Special Session (1931).
104 In 1930 twenty-nine states required a minimum capital of $25,000 and four
states, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey a minimum of
$50,000.
10 ,"The Situation that Confronts Banking," Report, p. 22.
106 Speaking in 1922 before the Wisconsin Bankers' Association, Marshall Cousins, Commissioner of Banking, in referring to efforts toward establishing a
larger minimum, said: "This matter has been considered by the legislatures
on a number of occasions and it is a surprising fact that the existing banks
have opposed an amendment to this section of the law. Such an amendment
would not affect existing banks. It would protect them." Proceedings of the
Twenty-eighth Annual Convention of the Wisconsin Bankers' Association,
107

p. 86 (1922).

Chapter 479, section 18, Laws of 1852.
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amendment in 186110$ allowed banks to begin business when $15,000
had been paid in. The law of 190319 provided for graduated minima,
depending upon the population of the place of the location of the
banks, but made the minimum for small places only $5,000. This was
a serious defect and was most decidedly a step backward," 0 but some
improvement was made in 1905111 when the minimum was placed at
$10,000. In 1916112 and in several subsequent years" 3 the commissioner emphatically called attention to the fact that the new minimum
was too low, and pointed out two factors upon which a change should
be predicated: a completion of the land improvement program in the
more remote regions of the state, and the presence of economic prosperity. In spite of the law, however, the commissioner was able to present, with reasonably successful results, the necessity for a larger
capital to many existing and newly chartered banks." 4 The commissioner's activities were handicapped by a law which taxed capital and
surplus instead of income."'
IMNPAIRINENT OF CAPITAL.

Control over the impairment of capital to be effective must be
coupled with both an adequate system of state supervision and inspection and a uniform system of bookkeeping. The former was not provided for until 189511 6 and the latter in 1903."17 While the law of
1852118 attempted to control this situation, it was largely ineffective for
the two reasons given, and receiverships frequently revealed fictitious
capital."' In connection with this matter of impairment of capital, the
Legislature of 1933 went as far as possible to keep banks open. Chap108 Chapter 242, section 14.

109 Chapter 234, chapter II, section 1.
110 The absence of merit was recognized before the bill became a law. See Ninth
Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 16 (1903). The original
bill provided for a minimum of $10,000, but was reduced because of the organized opposition of the one hundred and forty-eight private banks in the
state. See L. B. Krueger, "Evolution of Unit Banking, etc." op. cit., p. 212.
M Chapter 109, section 1. This remained until 1925 (chapter 292) when the
minimum was raised to $15,000.
112 Twenty-second Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 11.
"13 See Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p 20
(1919); Twenty-sixth Annual Report, p. xi (1920).
"14 Twenty-first Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 7 (1915).
115 Twenty-second Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 6 (1916).
:116 Chapter 291, section 6.

l17 Chapter 234, Chapter I, section 11.
11s Chapter 479, section 40. "If any portion of the original capital of any banking association shall be withdrawn for any purpose whatever, whilst any
debts of the association shall remain unsatisfied, no dividends or profits in
the shares of the capital stock of the association shall thereafter be made
until the deficit of capital shall have been made good, either by subscription
of the share-holders, or out of the subsequent accruing profits of the association. .. "

119 L. B. Krueger, "Revolution of Unit Banking, etc.," op. cit., p. 204.
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ter 6, section 4, Laws of 1933, states that any bank should be considered solvent if its assets at a fair valuation should be equal to or in
excess of its liabilities exclusive of capital stock.
RATIO OF CAPITAL TO DEPOSITS.

While it was possible to get a number of banks to increase their
capital voluntarily as their business grew, as has been pointed out, it
became progressively evident that the legislature should prescribe a
definite ratio between capital and deposits. The commissioner of banking in 1916120 stated that the deposits in some banks were in excess of
thirty times the amount of capital stock; while in 1919 there were certain banks with deposits exceeding capital by fifty times. 1 21
On the matter of a specific ratio there was some uncertainty, the
commissioner of banking pointing out that many authorities favored a
ratio of ten to one. He thought, however, that initially the ratio should
be fifteen to one, disregarding surplus, which was somewhat uncertain in quantity.

22

A law was passed in 1929123 embodying this sug-

gestion with respect to capital, but liberalizing by placing the ratio at
4
ten to one for surplus."
SURPLUS FUND.

The economic debacle which had its beginnings in 1929 brought
calamity to a number of banks and placed many others in an unenviable condition. In a time of extremity, legislative attention was focused
on the principle that the earnings should be in part retained for the
purpose of building up substantial surpluses. The law of 1903'12 had
provided that before any dividends should be paid, one-tenth of the
net-profits should be deducted and carried to surplus until the surplus
should amount to twenty per cent of the capital stock. But this was
not enough protection in a period of economic crisis. Therefore it was
provided in 1932126 that the surplus must be allowed to accumulate until it reaches fifty per cent.
Twenty-second Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 11 (1916).
12' Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 20 (1919).
120

122
723
124

Ibid.

Chapter 431.
Only on one occasion was this matter of capital-deposit ratio discussed in the
proceedings of the Visconsin Bankers' Association, so far as the writer has
been able to discover. F. J. Bohri argued in opposition to the legislative
designation of a ratio that bank growth was conducive to conservatism in the
making of loans and investments, and that large capital increased taxes
while lessening profits. Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth Annual Convention, pp. 85-86 (1918).
125 Chapter 234, chapter II, section 35.
126 Chapter 15, section 2, Laws of Special Session (1931).
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CASH RESERVE.

The bank examiner of 189612 recommended that a minimum of
available cash be required of all banks; but it was not until 1903 that
there was any legislation on the subject.2's A few changes in the requirements have been made since that time. The provision for fifteen
per cent of total deposits was reduced to twelve in 1915.12 The employment of one-third of the reserve in United States government
bonds was permitted in 1919 ;130 and in 1925131 it was provided that
federal reserve members need carry only the cash reserve required of
national bank members of the system.
LOANS TO OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS.

Among the several recommendations of the first bank examiner
was a law to prevent loans to officers, directors, or employees of a
bank without ample security, and then only after formal, recorded action of the board of directors.'
The law of 1903133 was only a halting step in the right direction.
It provided no limit on loans, and demanded no security in the form
of indorsement or collateral if the loan received the formal approval
of the board of directors.
The defects of this law were pointed out by the commissioner of
banking in 1909. As excessive loans were made under the law, he recommended that either the commissioner be given discretionary power
over such loans, or that the amount be definitely fixed by statute. 34
rhis matter became one of the important points to be acted upon by
the legislative committee on banking in 1910. That a firm stand was
taken by this committee is indicated by the following language from
their report:
the committee .... desire to submit the proposition that in

its (sic) opinion, no active officer of a bank should be permitted to
borrow a dollar of the bank's funds. It is apparent that a managing
officer of a bank stands in a moral sense, at least, in the relation of
trustee of the funds deposited in the bank ..... From the standpoint
of security to the banks, it would be wise legislation to extend this to
the directors of the bank, but it may be readily seen that in many in127 Third Semi-Annual Report, p. 7.
'28
129

Chapter 234, chapter II, section 25.
Chapter 75.

130 Chapter 578.
131 Chapter 292,

section 2.
Third Semi-Annual Report of the Bank Examiner, p. 7 (1896).
133 Chapter 234, chapter II, section 29.
134 Fourteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, pp. 12-13 (1909).
'32
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stances this would keep very good and able men off the board of directors."13 5
No legislative action was taken until 1925,136 when a provision was
made for a severe penalty by imprisonment for an officer or director
who borrowed in excess of one thousand dollars without a formal, recorded resolution of the board of directors, upon approved indorsements or collateral security. A 1931"'1 amendment declared that if the
amount borrowed exceeds one thousand dollars the entire loan must
be secured by indorsements or collateral, with the further important
provision that one director's indorsement cannot be accepted as sufficient for another.
LIMIT OF LOANS.

Although the size of loans to single interests is of great importance
from the standpoint of safety, not until 1903138 was there a legislative
declaration on the subject, a silence that had led not only to undesirable practices, but in many instances to bank failure.'31 The bank examiner in 1902 recommended a limitation on the size of loans in proportion to capitalization, but mentioned no specific percentage.140 The
Legislature of 1903, in pursuance of the commissioner's suggestion
that a limitation should be made, put the limit at thirty per cent of
capital and surplus, with the additional absurd provision that loans
might equal capital and surplus if made upon approved security and
voted by two-thirds of the board of directors. This would make it possible for a single failure to wipe out the entire capital. Such a loophole gave rise to "grave apprehensions" on the part of the commissioner of banking,' and resulted in a change in 1905141 in favor of a
restriction to fifty per cent upon the vote of the board of directors.
But this was still too liberal. For a period of several years the commissioner railed at the absence of significant limitations, recommending that the limitations should be twenty and thirty per cent of capital
and surplus, with and without the approval of directors, respectively.' 4 3
135 Report, p. 20. The same attitude was later expressed by the commissioner of

banking. "The law never contemplated the organization of banks as a mere
convenience for financing the private undertakings of its officers." Twentyninth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. vi (1923).
136 Chapter 292, section 3.
137 Chapter 252.
338 Chapter 234, chapter II, section 27.
139 See Eighth Annual Report of the Bank Examiner, p. x (1902).

740 Ibid.
14,
142
143

Ninth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 17 (1903).
Chapter 109, section 3.
Twenty-first Annual Report of the Commissioner of Banking, p. 11 (1915).
The commissioner in his report for 1919, p. 19, recommended, in addition,
a limit on the amount that could be discounted, the law having provided in
1903, following the federal enactment, that borrowed money should not in-
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It was not until "1925144 that the legislature made an absolute limitation of thirty per cent of capital and surplus. 145 The special legislative
session of 1931 reduced this to twenty per cent, with an additional
provision for a sworn statement from the borrower as to his assets
and liabilities, or for collateral security in excess of the loan, if the
amount borrowed equals two per cent or more of the capital and sur46

plus.1

LIMIT ON- REAL ESTATE LOANS.

As a commercial bank demands a high degree of liquidity, a source
of difficulty was found in the unrestricted loans on real estate security.
The defeated Banking Act of 1897 was strongly opposed by many because it too greatly curtailed the power of banks to loan on real
estate. 4 7 This particular act would have limited the loans to twenty
per cent of the capital stock, except that the amount might be increased
to twenty-five per cent of capital, surplus and deposits by a two-thirds
vote of the board of directors. Banks in small communities, however,
were to be allowed to loan up to thirty-three and one-third per cent of
capital, surplus and deposits.

4

The present law of Wisconsin on this subject, enacted in 1911,"
r&ads as follows:
"No bank shall lend any part of its capital, surplus or deposits
upon real estate mortgages or on any other form of real estate security,
directly or as collateral, except in this and adjoining states; nor shall
it lend on real estate mortgages or any other form of real estate security, an amount exceeding fifty per cent of the aggregate of its capital,
surplus and deposits, except when authorized as to amount, security
and location by resolution of two-thirds of its board of directors
properly entered upon its minutes."'5 0
elude the discounting, with qualifications, of bills of exchange and commercial paper. He spoke of tendencies toward the abuse of this provision, but
the legislature took no action.
-44 Chapter 292, section 2.
14 In 1927 (chapter 275) an exception was made in favor of municipal corporations.
146 Chapter 10, section 13.
14 Fifth Annual Report of the Bank Examiner, p. ix (1899).
148 Chapter 303, section 35.
'49Chapter 138, Laws of 1911.
150 The old law (chapter 234, chapter II, section 30, 1903) stated that "no bank
shall lend an amount exceeding fifty per centum of the aggregate of its
capital, surplus and deposits upon mortgages or any form of real estate security except when authorized as to amount, security and location in this and
the adjoining states by resolution of two-thirds of its board of directors... .
It was the purpose of this language to permit loans only on mortgages in
adjoining states, but the words were capable of misconstruction. A question
of interpretation arose when certain banks wished to make loans in southern states. The attorney general held that the statute by implication authorized loans which did not exceed fifty per cent of capital, surplus and deposits. Fifth Biennial Report of the Attorney General, p. 75 (1910). See also
Report of the Special Committee on Banking, p. 35 (1910).
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LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS.

Remarkable because it virtually stands alone in the law of 1852 as
a protection for the depositor, is a provision' 5' which makes every
stockholder of every corporation or association organized under the
act individually responsible to the amount of his respective shares of
stock for all of its liabilities, regardless of kind. That this amounted
to double liability was decided in Coleman v. White :152
"We are of the opinion that the liability is primary and absolute
and attaches the moment the debt is contracted by the bank-that it is
a liability of all the stockholders to all the creditors, in the principle
of co-partnership, the stockholders standing on substantially the same
footing as though they were partners

....

save only that the respon-

sibility -of each is limited to a sum equal to his share or shares of
stock."1 53

Double liability was provided for in the law of 1903,154 with the
exception, however, that liability should not extend beyond six months
from the transfer of the shares. 55 In 1915156 there was an addition
that liability should accrue immediately and be enforced by the commissioner of banking, with reimbursement out of any remaining property upon liquidation.
The depositor was given additional security by a provision in
1880157 permitting stockholders of a bank under the law of 1852 to
file a declaration of unlimited liability with the state treasurer, a pro151 Chapter 479, section 47.
152

14 Wis. 700 (1861).

p. 701.
154 Chapter 234, chapter II, section 39. A provision, following the federal act,
153

'55

contains the words "equally and ratably, not one for another." These words
are given the same meaning as that given by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Schvenker v. Bekkedal, 204 'Vis. 546, 236 N.W. 581 (1931).
An amendment was made in the special session of 1931 that the liability
should continue for six months after written notice to the commissioner of
banking of any transfer. (Chapter 10, section 13). A further amendment
was made in 1933 continuing this liability for one year. (Chapter 17, section 1,
Laws of 1933). The purpose of these amendments is to prevent transfers made
to escape liability. It appears that the law needs further strengthening, however, as only those transfers are invalid which are made when a bank is under notice to make good an impairment of capital (section 221.43, Statutes of
1931). A law providing that all transfers must be approved by the commissioner would probably be a step in the right direction.

156 Chapter 168.
157 Chapter 223, section 3. This law was not mandatory and doubtless was un-

constitutional, as it has never been submitted to a vote of the people. Not all
legislation concerning banks, however, needed to be submitted to the people.
Duties might be placed upon banks under the exercise of the police power.
It is unlikely that a court would have construed this provision other than as
an amendment of the banking law. See Van Steenmwyck v. Sackett, 17 \Vis.
645 (1864).
The stockholders of only one institution, the Wkisconsin Mfarine and Fire
Insurance Company, known as "Mitchell's bank," ever filed under the provision. Ho-ward Louis Conrad, "History of Milwaukee," 1898, Vol. I, p. 279.
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vision that had been vigorously recommended by Alexander Mitchell,""8 a leading financier of the time. A similar provision was incorporated in the law of 1903,19 and remains today as a part of the
160
statutes.
IIULTIPLE BANKING.

Of the three types of multiple banking, chain, group, and branch, 6'
the first and second are permitted by Wisconsin laws, while the third
is prohibited. This provision, which was effected in 1909,162 did not

apply, however, to the branch banks in existence as of that date.
It is not the purpose of this discussion to set forth the arguments
for or against multiple banking, 1 63 but to present the situation as it exists in the state. Group banking has been growing rapidly in the United States,'6 4 and the movement was developing in Wisconsin before the
downturn of the business cycle in 1929. There has been vigorous political opposition to group banking in the state, the principal arguments being that banking should not be employed as a medium of
speculative enterprise, 16 5 and that it is a species of financial autocracy. 166 Legislative control of chain and group banking was unsuchas been described as a man "who for executive and financial ability and
business integrity, has had no superior west of New York, if he has had
there." William, George Bruce, "History of Milwaukee," 1922, Vol. I, p. 343.
159 Chapter 234, chapter II, section 46.
160 Inquiry of the banking department reveals that there have been several declarations under the law, but, with one exception, they have been withdrawn.
161 Chain banking is a term used to designate a form of organization in which
banks are separately chartered, but are owned or controlled by one individual
or a group of individuals without the responsibility of a publicly known corporate head organization; group banking is used to refer to a system of individually chartered banks with control centered in a holding corporation,
which is responsible for their administration, but which assumes obligations
of collective responsibility not imposed by law; branch banking is employed
to describe a single chartered institution with sub-offices, each sub-office, as
well as the head office, doing a general banking business. For the distinction
made between the terms "chain banking" and "group banking" by J. W. Pole,
158He

Comptroller of the Currency, see Hearings before the Committee on Banking
and Currency, House of Representatives, 71st Congress, 2nd Session, under
H. R. 141, V. 1. pt. 1, p. 26, 33.
162 Chapter 135.
163 For an excellent compilation of arguments for and against multiple banking,
see "Selected Articles on Chain, Group, and Branch Banking," compiled by
Virgil WVillit, New York (1930).
'164 "In spite of much criticism and opposition, group banking is developing with
amazing rapidity. At the present time group banks control one-fifth of the
bank resources of the country." Ibid, p. 10.
165 "One of the substantial evils of chain or group banking is that it introduces
stock promotion into the ownership of banks.... Those that are appealed
to by speculative profits and various forms of gambling have no place in and
should be ruthlessly excluded from banking." Message of Philip F. La Follette to the Special Legislature of 1931, Assembly Journal, p. 35.
166 Governor La Follette also condemns chain banking as a "bold challenge to
Americanism and democracy." "Chain Banking," an address before The
Tripoli Temple Booster Club of M\ilwaukee, December 6, 1929.
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cessfully attempted through the Clearing House Association bill, which
has been previously discussed.
LIQUIDATION

AND REORGANIZATION

OF DELINQUENT BANKS.

The old method,-slow, expensive, inefficient,--in case a bank became insolvent or found itself in a position of not being able to restore an impaired capital, was to place it in receivership under the direction of the court. This method was provided for both in the law
of 190117 and 1903.16s A much better method is to provide that in
case of delinquency the affairs and property shall be immediately taken
over by the commissioner of banking. This was the purpose of a law
in 1909.169

In many cases, however, the interests of all concerned are best
served, not by liquidation, but by reorganization and consolidation.
For the attainment of this end, the commissioner is given power to approve reorganization plans, and to appoint an ample number of assistants to facilitate the work. That minority opposition might not be
an obstacle, the legislature provided that if eighty per cent 7 of the
unsecured creditors agree, their agreement shall be controlling. 7'

STATE CONTROL THROUGI

PUBLIC DEPOSITS.

Prior to 1931 the banks made a bid for public funds, and upon being approved as public depositories by the proper governmental authority, they proceeded to furnish a surety bond to guarantee the funds in
their possession. But the commercially tragic year of 1931 found few
companies writing public depository bonds, and even these few were

charging enormously high premium rates. Furthermore, many banks
7 2
could not obtain these bonds even at the prevailing excessive rates.
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Chapter 317.
Chapter 234, chapter I, sections 7 and 8.
Chapter 396. The law of 1903 (chapter 234, chapter II, section 24) provided
that banks finding themselves in trouble could place their affairs and assets
under the control of the commissioner of banking. This, of course, was a
non-mandatory provision. The commissioner made this comment in 1904:
"The unique provisions of this section of the law have been resorted to on
several occasions and in each case have been vindicated both as to their wisdom and practicability." Tenth Annual Report, p. xv.
For a period of not exceeding two years the commissioner may waive the
eighty per cent requirement in its application to stabilization and readjustment agreements, i. e., those agreements entered injo by banks while they
are still open. Chapter 26, section 3, Laws of Special Session (1931).
Chapter 10, sections 8 and 9; Chapter 15, section 2; Chapter 26, section 3,
Laws of Special Session (1931).
See a summary of recent banking legislation in Wisconsin, together with a
statement of some of the conditions leading up to this legislation by Robert
B, L. Murphy (1932) 7 Wis. Law Review 255.
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Out of this puzzling and highly critical situation was evolved a
legislative program known as the public deposits law, 7 3 embodying
these essential features: (a) the designation of qualified banks by
governing boards'
to act as public depositories, (b) the fixing of
rates of interest by the board of deposits' 75 on these public funds, (c)
a limitation on the amount' that may be placed in any one depository,
(d) a power in the board of deposits to require information concerning any depository, and (e) the creation of a state deposit fund, under
the administration of the state treasurer, to be used to reimburse public depositors for any losses resulting from the failure of a public depository. This fund is accumulated by the payment on the part of
depository banks of a certain percentage' 77 on the average daily balance of the public depositor, to be collected from the depositor.
Questions as to the success of this new law in providing satisfactory security for public depositors, and its influence on the banking
situation in the state can only be answered by the course of developments in the future. However, certain features of the law, viz., the
authoritative voice of the state in the determination of rates of interest to be paid on balances, indirectly affecting the type of security
in which these funds will be invested by the banks, the power in the
board of deposits to obtain any information concerning the depository,
the limitation on the amount of deposit that can be made in any one
depository, together with the new financial interest of the state in the
integrity of the banking structure, give rise to interesting speculations
as to the possibilities of these additional lines of state supervision and
control.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

The conception that there is any common right to engage in the
banking business has during the last quarter century been dealt a

succession of very severe legislative blows. The first blow came in
1903 when it was made legally impossible for interests to use the
work "bank" in any form or in any place unless those interests were
engaged in authorized banking; the second came in 1909'17 when it was
'173 Chapter 1, Laws of Special Session
3.74 A governing board is defined as the

(1931).
county board or committee of that board
in case of a county, the city council in case of a city, etc.
175 The board of deposits consists of the governor and the commissioners of
public lands.
176 The maximum is twenty per cent of the average daily deposits in the depository, but not exceeding twice the paid-up capital and surplus.
77
'1 The rate has been fixed at one per cent annually, subject to change by the
board of deposits on the recommendation of the commissioner of insurance
and the commissioner of banking. It is the purpose to have the rate fixed so
as to have sufficient funds, and no more, for prospective contingencies.
178 Chapter 285, section 2. The constitutionality of this provision was decided in
Weed v. Bergh, 141 Wis. 569, 124 N.W. 664, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1217 (1910).
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enacted that no one could engage in the banking business without being incorporated; and the final blows were administered in the years
beginning with and succeeding 1915 when the banking department of
the state was given powers of a dictatorial nature on the question as
to whether even an incorporated company should engage in the business.
Certain conclusions can be drawn and questions raised from this
historical study of the most important controls of the state over the
business of banking. One of the most significant facts is that Wisconsin is attempting to find safety for depositors in more and more legislative and administrative regulation rather than in confidence in the
ability of bankers and reliance upon private initiative in the process
of emerging from a difficult banking situation. It should be made clear,
however, that ability, confidence in that ability, and the drive of individual leadership can never be supplanted by even the most refined
governmental controls.
It is, of course, impossible to divorce banking entirely from the
speculative forces which endanger business in general, and which give
rise to the business cycle, or to separate pretty legal theories and elaborate administrative machinery from the foibles of human nature.
One cannot justly accuse the Legislature of Wisconsin with the possession of such blind optimism that it was believed that there might be
established a sort of "Utopia" in which bank failures should become
so rare as to be phenomena at the nadir of a business cycle. On the
other hand, it has been discovered through experience in this state and
elsewhere that there are certain fundamentals in a sound banking system. Among these fundamentals are that the inevitable periods of
business depression must be prepared for in times of prosperity; that
careful and able supervision can discover and check dangerous tendencies; that there are banks which should never find a corporate life;
that there are banks in existence which should be consolidated or
liquidated; that there are banking practices that can never be attended
with ultimate success; and that there are bankers who have no right
to occupy a position of public trust.
Without reflection on past legislative achievements, it should be
pointed out that mere elaborate measures are worse than none at all.
A legislative gesture toward strict control is like a hollow philosophy
embraced in sonorous phrases. If a legislature sets up a system of
On the question as to whether this was regulation or prohibition, the court
said: "The question is not whether it be the wisest form of regulation, or
whether it be a form which commends itself to the judgment as ideal, but
whether it be in fact a bona fide form of regulation with some reasonable
public adaptation to meet and overcome any evils or dangers to the public
which may lurk in unrestrained exercise of banking rights by individuals.
WVe think it is."
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stringent control, with large discretionary powers either in a commission or a commissioner, it must show a liberality in the compensation
of its most important servants, and accompany the system in general
with proper financial sustenance so that those who occupy high positions of control have the respect of the banking fraternity, have ability
commensurate with the powers, and the use of instruments and personnel to command the facts upon which judgments must be based.
The adoption of the principle that the primary concern of the
state is safety for the dependent public at the cost of large inroads on
private rights, embodied in the statement of Walter C. Owen that "no
imposition or burden, not destructive of the business itself, should be
given the least consideration in opposition to any plan or system that
makes for the security of the depositor," is in only the initial stages of
evolution. An approach has been made by giving the banking department control over bank officials upon any indication of mismanagement, 179 large powers to preserve the integrity of capital and other assets, and jurisdiction, without minority interference, in case of delinquency, to promulgate plans without delay, whether f9r liquidation,
consolidation, or reorganization. An appraisal of this evolutionary
process, however, at this time is practically impossible, as most of the
work that has been and is being done is in the nature of hospitalization.
Where this evolutionary path in governmental control will lead is,
therefore, problematical. Once the handicap of a constitutional provision, having its roots in a historic prejudice, had been removed, the
Banking Act of 1903 became a second landmark of improvement in
the legislative history of the state. What will be the position of the
enactments of 1931 remains for the future. At the threshold of this
new advance into the unexplored territory of elaborate control a few
questions present themselves. Will the possibilities of bureaucratic
control throttle private initiative? Can genuine administrative ability
be brought into the service of the state, and if brought in, are the possibilities of error so great as to impair initiative and destroy -confidence? Can the large powers be really used, or will there be only the
nominal functioning of a theoretically powerful body in the process of
pathetic decay? Will an attitude of parsimonious financial policy deter the entrance of the best ability, and cripple the exercise of existing
powers? However these questions are answered, it would appear that
legislative responsibility is, by virtue of the important step taken, indeed very great.
"17

Attention is called to Chapter 6, section 4, Laws of 1933, which provides that
the banking department may request the removal of any officer or director
whose policies or practices are prejudical to the interests of the depositors.
If the request is not complied with the commissioner may effect the removal
by order which shall have the same effect as if made by the board of directors
or stockholders of the bank concerned.

